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THIRD PARTY FRAUD INDUCING MATERIAL MISTAKE 
SLIP KNOT INVESTMENTS 777 (PTY) LTD V DU TOIT 2011 4 SA 72 
(SCA) 
 
C-J Pretorius* 
 
1 Introduction 
 
A problem that has perplexed the courts for some time, and to which there has been 
no clear answer, is whether the material mistake of a contractant induced solely by 
the deliberate interventions of an independent third party is sufficient to sustain a 
plea of iustus error (on the part of the contract denier) or, conversely, a lack of 
reasonable reliance (on the part of the contract assertor) raised by the mistaken 
party. A third party may be regarded as someone who does not act in collusion with, 
or as the agent of, either of the contractual parties. Consequently, the conduct of the 
third party cannot be attributed directly to either party.1 Deliberate third-party conduct 
generally tends to be problematic as regards the law of obligations.2 Within the realm 
of contract it manifests as fraudulent misrepresentation by the third party causing a 
mistake (either material or non-material) on the part of a contractant. The position in 
regard to non-material mistake has been settled for some time, but cases dealing 
with material mistake caused in this manner tend to reflect inconsistency and 
contradiction. On the whole the Supreme Court of Appeal has been silent on the 
matter,3 but recently in Slip Knot Investments v Du Toit4 this court was not prepared 
to uphold a plea of iustus error where the mistake in question was caused by third 
parties and not the contract assertor. Although the court's decision provides some 
much needed direction, it is suggested that there may well be exceptional situations 
                                                          
*  Chris-James Pretorius. BLC LLB LLD. Professor in Private Law, Unisa. E-Mail: 
pretocj1@unisa.ac.za. 
1  See Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 108. 
2  See more comprehensively Pretorius 2011a THRHR 65 and further, Pretorius 2011b THRHR 
182 and further. 
3  Although in Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman 1979 3 SA 978 (A) 1000B Jansen JA 
appears to have at least entertained the notion that the fraudulent misrepresentation of a third 
party causing dissensus could influence the existence of a contract. 
4  Slip Knot Investments v Du Toit 2011 4 SA 72 (SCA). 
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where contractual liability should not lie. This note examines third-party fraud within 
the context of the law of mistake in the light of the approach adopted by the court. 
 
2 Facts 
 
The respondent was a sixty-year old farmer and a trustee of a trust along with his 
brother and the latter's son. The trust was created by the respondent's brother, who 
was a beneficiary of the income of the trust and administered the trust solely in his 
own interests and those of his heirs. The respondent had no interest in the trust 
assets or its income. The trustees, including the respondent, signed a deed of 
suretyship in favour of the appellant as security for advancing a sum of R6 million to 
the trust. Judgment was obtained against the trust and sureties after the trust failed 
to adhere to the terms of a settlement agreement. The sequestration of the trust and 
the estate of the respondent's brother ensued. The respondent admitted signing the 
deed of suretyship, but denied that he was liable as surety, alleging that he had 
signed by mistake and without the intention to incur contractual liability. He brought 
an application for rescission of the judgment against him as surety, which was 
granted. The main application subsequently came before Kruger J in the Free State 
High Court who dismissed the appellant's application for judgment against the 
respondent but gave leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal.5 
 
The facts material to the signing of the suretyship by the respondent are as follows: 
on the particular day the respondent's nephew telephoned the respondent's friend, 
one Potgieter, and told her that he had certain documents that required the 
respondent's signature. They concerned business transactions of his father in Africa 
and had to be signed urgently and returned by telefacsimile the same day. The 
respondent knew of his brother's dealings in Africa and regarded them as risky. At 
the relevant time the respondent was on his farm. Potgieter relayed the conversation 
and informed him that the documents had to be signed before a commissioner of 
oaths. He was, however, busy and requested her to wait. After two further calls to 
her from his nephew, Potgieter again spoke to the respondent and emphasised the 
urgency of the matter. She gave him a bundle of documents comprising some 75 
                                                          
5  Slip Knot Investments v Du Toit 2011 4 SA 72 (SCA) para 3. 
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pages pertaining to the R6 million loan to the trust, which had already been signed 
by his brother and nephew. Amongst these documents was the suretyship. The 
respondent was prepared to sign the documents without reading them because he 
thought that he was not personally affected and the two other trustees had already 
signed. In consequence, he assumed that his brother and nephew had agreed to the 
terms on which the appellant would advance monies to the trust and that his 
signature was required as a mere formality. The respondent and his son went to the 
manager of the First National Bank in Luckhoff, a commissioner of oaths, to sign the 
documents. The manager happened to know of the transaction which somehow 
reassured the respondent that the documents related to his brother's trust only. 
Thereafter the documents were duly signed and sent by telefacsimile to the 
respondent's brother. Although he did not read the documents the respondent stated 
that he never expected a suretyship to be amongst them and no one drew his 
attention to the suretyship.6 
 
3 Decision 
 
The decisions of the court a quo and Supreme Court of Appeal differ markedly on 
the question of whether or not the respondent's plea of iustus error was sustainable, 
which is a reflection of the difficulty that the courts generally have experienced in 
adjudicating similar cases. 
 
3.1 Court a quo 
 
In the court a quo Kruger J found that the respondent's mistake was reasonable. In 
reaching this conclusion he emphasised the following: the respondent was a farmer 
who had nothing to do with the business of the trust and the loan to it by the 
appellant. He was further not a businessman and knew that the documents related to 
his brother's risky venture in Africa, which did not concern him. It was also because 
he was put under considerable pressure to sign them forthwith that the respondent 
believed that the documents did not affect him. Furthermore, there were no 
negotiations between the appellant and respondent. The bank manager, in addition, 
                                                          
6  Slip Knot Investments v Du Toit 2011 4 SA 72 (SCA) paras 4-7. 
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informed the respondent that he was aware of the transaction and that had set the 
respondent's mind at rest. The suretyship was further not prominent amongst the 
documents presented to the respondent for signing. Kruger J found that in a sense 
the respondent's brother and nephew had acted as the appellant's agents and 
should have warned him of the suretyship, and that the respondent had no reason to 
expect a personal suretyship to be among the documents he signed.7 
 
3.2 Supreme Court of Appeal 
 
The crisp question on appeal was whether the respondent could be absolved from 
liability under the suretyship where his (material) mistake was not induced by the 
other contractant (the appellant),8 but rather the apparently fraudulent omission of 
third parties (his nephew and primarily his brother) to inform him of the nature of the 
document (suretyship) that he had been called upon to sign.9 In delivering the 
judgement of the Supreme Court of Appeal, Malan JA affirmed that generally a 
contractual party is not obliged to inform the other party of the terms of the proposed 
agreement,10 unless there are provisions that could not reasonably have been 
expected to be part of the contract.11 While the court a quo concluded that the 
suretyship was "hidden" in the bundle of documents, Malan JA found nothing 
objectionable in the documents and that even a cursory glance at them would have 
alerted the respondent to the deed of suretyship. There was further nothing 
misleading in the bundle and the inclusion of a suretyship among the documents was 
not unexpected. The learned judge was critical of the emphasis placed in the court a 
quo on the fact that the respondent was a farmer and not a businessman, and that 
he had nothing to do with the trust and loan advanced to it. The respondent was a 
trustee of the trust; he must have known what a trust was and what the duties and 
responsibilities of a trustee were. Malan JA applied the reliance theory to the facts 
                                                          
7  Slip Knot Investments v Du Toit 2011 4 SA 72 (SCA) para 10. 
8  It was clear that the fraud or misrepresentation of the respondent's relatives could not be 
attributed to the appellant (para 11). 
9  Slip Knot Investments v Du Toit 2011 4 SA 72 (SCA) paras 1-2. 
10  With reference to Constantia Insurance Co Ltd v Compusource (Pty) Ltd 2005 4 SA 345 (SCA) 
para 19. 
11  With reference to Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 36; see also Fourie 
v Hansen 2001 1 All SA 510 (W) 516. See also Potgieter v British Airways plc 2005 3 SA 133 (C) 
140. 
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and concluded that the appellant was entitled to rely on the respondent's signature 
as a surety in the same manner as it was entitled to rely on his signature as a 
trustee. The respondent further acted entirely on what was conveyed to him by his 
nephew through Potgieter. The appellant made no misrepresentation to him and 
there was no suggestion that the appellant knew or ought, as a reasonable person, 
to have known of the respondent's mistake. In consequence, the appeal was upheld 
and the respondent was held liable under the suretyship.12 
 
4 Commentary 
 
There is authority for both the decision in the court a quo and the Supreme Court of 
Appeal. It is, however, suggested that the approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
is preferable, but the question that begs is if in all instances where the material 
mistake of a contractant has been caused by the fraud of a third party contractual 
liability nevertheless should lie as a matter of strict principle. After all, one is 
potentially dealing with two innocent parties:13 the contract denier's mistake has 
been induced by the fraudulent conduct of a third party, while the reliance of the 
contract assertor has been caused by the contract denier. Why should the contract 
assertor necessarily be in a preferential position to the contract denier? As will be 
suggested, much depends on which approach to material mistake weighs heavier as 
a matter of legal policy,14 but that in itself should not preclude exceptions to the 
general rule in appropriate circumstances. 
 
4.1 Contradiction in case law 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal seemed to accept that the third parties who induced 
the respondent's mistake acted fraudulently, and it is highly probable that they did.15 
Decisions on third-party fraud inducing material mistake reflect a fair measure of 
                                                          
12  Slip Knot Investments v Du Toit 2011 4 SA 72 (SCA) para 12. 
13  See Christie and Bradfield Christie's The Law of Contract 184; Floyd and Pretorius 1992 THRHR 
673. 
14  Christie and Bradfield Christie's The Law of Contract 184 emphasise "the value, especially in 
commercial matters, of being able to assume that the signatory is bound by his signature". 
15  Compare paras 8 and 11 of Slip Knot Investments v Du Toit 2011 4 SA 72 (SCA). 
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inconsistency, especially where the iustus error doctrine is involved. In some cases 
the courts have been very tentative about this issue16 and in others they have 
avoided addressing it if at all possible.17 The case law has been analysed in detail 
elsewhere and does not bear repeating in any detail.18 For present purposes it is 
sufficient to state that in some instances the courts have been prepared to absolve a 
party from contractual liability where his or her mistake has been caused by the 
fraudulent interventions of a third party,19 while on other occasions they have not.20 
The rationales for these decisions, however, have not always been convincing. 
Academic opinion tends to be against recognising that the fraud of the third party 
necessarily releases the mistaken party from liability.21 
 
Two factors in particular appear to have influenced the courts in this regard: firstly, 
the law relating to actionable misrepresentation,22 where the position is that unless 
the fraud emanates from one of the contracting parties it has no effect on the 
contract;23 and secondly, the question of negligence on the part of the contract 
denier either to justify liability where present24 or to absolve the mistaken party where 
                                                          
16  See Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman 1979 3 SA 978 (A) 1000B. 
17  See e.g. Siffman v Kriel 1909 TS 538 546; Khan v Naidoo 1989 3 SA 724 (N) 727. 
18  See Pretorius 2011b THRHR 186-190; and further Christie and Bradfield Christie's The Law of 
Contract 183-184, 282, 331-332; Lewis 1987 SALJ 371 and further; Hutchison and Van Heerden 
1987 SALJ 529-530. 
19  See e.g. Musgrove and Watson (Rhod) (Pvt) Ltd v Rotta 1978 2 SA 918 (R); Kok v Osborne 
1993 4 SA 788 (SE); Musgrove and Watson (Rhodesia) Ltd v Rotta 1978 4 SA 656 (RA) 658A-B; 
Western Province Wine Depot Ltd v Bellingham 1966 1 SA 349 (T) 353. 
20  See e.g. Standard Bank v Du Plooy; Standard Bank v Coetzee 1899 16 SC 161; Standard Credit 
Corporation Ltd v Naicker 1987 2 SA 49 (N); Trans-Drakensberg Bank Ltd v Guy 1964 1 SA 790 
(D) 797C-D; Khan v Naidoo 1989 3 SA 724 (N) 727. 
21  Compare e.g. Wessels Wessels' Law of Contract para 1122; Forsyth and Pretorius Caney's The 
Law of Suretyship 67; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 47; Lewis 1987 SALJ 
374 and further; Christie and Bradfield Christie's The Law of Contract 331. 
22  That is culpable misrepresentation inducing non-material mistake. 
23  Karabus Motors (1959) Ltd v Van Eck 1962 1 SA 451 (C) 453D; Fedbond Nominees (Pty) Ltd v 
Meier 2008 1 SA 458 (C) 462F-H; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 108; Kerr 
Principles of the Law of Contract 279; Van Rensburg et al "Contract" 236; Hutchison and 
Pretorius Law of Contract 122.  See further Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman 1979 
3 SA 978 (A) 999-1000; Bodemer v American Insurance Co 1961 2 SA 662 (A). In Standard 
Credit Corporation Ltd v Naicker 1987 2 SA 49 (N) 51J-52A Milne JP referred with apparent 
approval to Karabus Motors (1959) Ltd v Van Eck 1962 1 SA 451 (C) 453D where the court 
formulated the rule as follows: "It is a general rule of our law that if the fraud which induces a 
contract does not proceed from one of the parties, but from an independent third person, it will 
have no effect upon the contract. The fraud must be the fraud of one of the parties or of a third 
party acting in collusion with, or as the agent of, one of the parties". 
24  See e.g. Standard Credit Corporation Ltd v Naicker 1987 2 SA 49 (N) 53H-J. 
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absent.25 Both factors are open to criticism. The analogy with misrepresentation is 
perhaps at best a useful guideline26 since the iustus error doctrine and the reliance 
theory do not apply in that instance, but certainly do where material mistake is in 
question.27 The fault principle is more problematic and its application within the realm 
of mistake has drawn criticism on the basis that a comparison of degrees of fault 
between parties is unworkable.28 At times the use of fault has also been questioned 
by the judiciary.29 It is suggested that although fault is not a strict requirement under 
the tests for reliance or iustus error it generally remains a useful tool when balancing 
the equities of cases of dissensus.30 Within the context of third-party fraud, however, 
it appears to be superfluous, because when a party has been deceived by the 
fraudulent conduct of another, surely his or her negligence is nullified by the 
intentional act of the deceiver?31 Moreover, virtually in all instances of material 
mistake induced in this manner the negligence of the contract denier has in main 
consisted of not reading a contractual document before signing it.32 The courts vary 
in their interpretation of such conduct, at times labelling it negligent, while at other 
times not.33 Focusing on negligence simply does not seem to take the matter any 
further: if the contract denier was not negligent and actually read the contractual 
document before signing it, then surely there would have been no mistake to speak 
of. Rather, the point is that the fraudster has managed to lull the mistaken party into 
                                                          
25  See e.g. Kok v Osborne 1993 4 SA 788 (SE) 800D. 
26  Christie and Bradfield Christie's The Law of Contract 331 are of the opinion that "[o]n balance it 
seems slightly preferable that the rule stated in Karabus Motors (1959) Ltd v Van Eck 1962 1 SA 
451 (C) 453 should prevail and the third party's fraud should have no effect on the contract." In 
the present matter, however, Malan JA was mindful of the fact that Karabus Motors applied to 
non-material errors and not the issue of mistake proper (Karabus Motors (1959) Ltd v Van Eck 
1962 1 SA 451 (C) 76A-B). 
27  See Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman 1979 3 SA 978 (A) 1000B; cf Hutchison and 
Van Heerden 1987 SALJ 530. 
28  See Lewis 1987 SALJ 376; Hutchison and Van Heerden 1987 SALJ 528; cf Février-Breed 1996 
THRHR 212 and further. 
29  Compare e.g. Sonap Petroleum (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 3 SA 234 (A) 240C; Davids 
v Absa Bank Bpk 2005 3 SA 361 (C) 369H. 
30  See Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 49; Van der Merwe and Van Huyssteen 
1993 TSAR 496; Floyd 1996 THRHR 569; Pretorius 2005b THRHR 587. 
31  See further in this regard Pretorius 2011b THRHR 189; Floyd and Pretorius 1992 THRHR 671-
672; cf Kerr Principles of the Law of Contract 278-279; Lewis 1987 SALJ 374. 
32  The resulting mistake is usually one regarding the nature of the juristic act in question or rather 
an error in negotio (see Joubert General Principles of the Law of Contract 73, 77; Van der Merwe 
et al Contract: General Principles 26; Hutchison and Pretorius Law of Contract 88). 
33  Contrast e.g. Standard Credit Corporation Ltd v Naicker 1987 2 SA 49 (N) 51 and further with 
Kok v Osborne 1993 4 SA 788 (SE) 799-800. 
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not bothering to read a contractual document before signing it. Should the latter be 
penalised simply because the deceiver has succeeded in perpetrating the fraud?34 It 
is suggested that in the light of the apparent difficulties surrounding negligence within 
this context it seems best to leave it out of the enquiry altogether.35 
 
Fortunately, the decision in Slip Knot brings an element of certainty as to how such 
matters should be dealt with. As a general proposition the Supreme Court of Appeal 
considered the fraudulent conduct of a third party inducing operative mistake not to 
necessarily preclude contractual liability.36 The position in regard to mistake is then 
broadly similar to that regarding the law of misrepresentation. But what remains to be 
seen is if sense can be made of past judicial statements acknowledging that there 
may be instances when third party fraud will in fact act as a bar to contractual 
liability.37 It is important to note that while Malan JA did refer to some of the case law, 
he did not overrule any decisions or aspects thereof.38 In principle, then, it seems 
that exceptions to the general rule are indeed possible. 
 
4.2 Third party fraud and the tests for iustus error and reliance 
 
Even a casual glance at the classic formulations in positive law of the iustus error 
doctrine and the reliance theory reveals that they do not make provision for material 
mistake induced by third-party fraud.39 As regards iustus error, Malan JA referred to 
the statement of principle firstly in George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd: 
 
Has the first party - the one who is trying to resile - been to blame in the sense that 
by his conduct he has led the other party, as a reasonable man, to believe that he 
                                                          
34  See Kerr Principles of the Law of Contract 278-279. 
35  See further Pretorius 2011b THRHR 190-191; Lewis 1987 SALJ 376. 
36  See especially paras 11-12 of Slip Knot Investments v Du Toit 2011 4 SA 72 (SCA). 
37  Compare e.g. Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman 1979 3 SA 978 (A) 1000B; 
Musgrove and Watson (Rhodesia) Ltd v Rotta 1978 4 SA 656 (RA) 658B; Musgrove and Watson 
(Rhod) (Pvt) Ltd v Rotta 1978 2 SA 918 (R) 925D; Kok v Osborne 1993 4 SA 788 (SE) 800C-D; 
Standard Credit Corporation Ltd v Naicker 1987 2 SA 49 (N) 52B-C; Standard Bank v Du Plooy; 
Standard Bank v Coetzee 1899 16 SC 161 172. 
38  Slip Knot Investments v Du Toit 2011 4 SA 72 (SCA) 76. 
39  There have been further adaptations of the iustus error doctrine (e.g.Brink v Humphries and 
Jewell (Pty) Ltd 2005 2 SA 412 (SCA) para 8), but they have not gained general acceptance and 
tend to be problematic (see further Pretorius 2009 Obiter 767-768 and the authorities cited 
there). 
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was binding himself? ... If his mistake is due to a misrepresentation, whether 
innocent or fraudulent, by the other party, then, of course, it is the second party who 
is to blame, and the first party is not bound.40 
 
And secondly in National and Overseas Distributors Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Potato 
Board: 
 
Our law allows a party to set up his own mistake in certain circumstances in order to 
escape liability under a contract into which he has entered. But where the other 
party has not made any misrepresentation and has not appreciated at the time of 
acceptance that his offer was being accepted under a misapprehension, the scope 
for a defence of unilateral mistake is very narrow, if it exists at all. At least the 
mistake (error) would have to be reasonable (justus) and it would have to be 
pleaded.41 
 
Both statements rely heavily on a misrepresentation42 on the part of the contract 
assertor to render the mistake of the contract denier reasonable. Although 
traditionally the courts have regarded misrepresentation as the most important factor 
in this regard,43 there are other circumstances in which a mistake may be found to be 
excusable. Since the iustus error approach is regarded as an indirect manifestation 
of the reliance theory44 it follows that a mistake may be iustus where there is a lack 
of reasonable reliance on the part of the contract assertor.45 More specific to our 
present purposes, however, there are indications in case law that a mistake may be 
reasonable simply because the contract denier acted reasonable and without fault.46 
                                                          
40  George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 1958 2 SA 465 (A) 471A-D. Affirmed in e.g. Du Toit v Atkinson's 
Motors Bpk 1985 2 SA 893 (A) 903I-J; Spindrifter (Pty) Ltd v Lester Donovan (Pty) Ltd 1986 1 SA 
303 (A) 315A-B; Hlobo v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 2001 2 SA 59 (SCA) 65J-
66B. 
41  National and Overseas Distributors Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Potato Board 1958 2 SA 473 (A) 
479G-H. Affirmed in e.g. Hlobo v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 2001 2 SA 59 (SCA) 
66G-I; Stiff v Q Data Distribution (Pty) Ltd 2003 2 SA 336 (SCA) 341G; Brink v Humphries and 
Jewell (Pty) Ltd 2005 2 SA 419 (SCA) 430A-C. 
42  A misrepresentation can occur either by positive conduct or by omission where a duty to speak 
exists in the circumstances (see Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 47-48; 
Hutchison and Pretorius Law of Contract 100-102; Pretorius 2004b THRHR 551-553). 
43  See Lubbe and Murray Farlam and Hathaway - Contract 165-167; Hawthorne and Pretorius 
Contract Law Casebook 46-47. 
44  Van Rensburg 1986 THRHR 453; Hutchison and Van Heerden 1987 SALJ 525; Pretorius 2004b 
THRHR 558. 
45  Prins v Absa Bank Ltd 1998 3 SA 904 (C) 908; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 
48-49; Hutchison and Van Heerden 1987 SALJ 524; Hutchison and Pretorius Law of Contract 
103; Pretorius 2004 THRHR 553. 
46  Compare e.g. Horty Investments (Pty) Ltd v Interior Acoustics (Pty) Ltd 1984 3 SA 537 (W) 539; 
Kok v Osborne 1993 4 SA 788 (SE) 800; see Prins v Absa Bank 1998 3 SA 904 (C) 908; 
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This seems to have been the line taken by the court a quo in Slip Knot. As previously 
mentioned, it is this latter interpretation of iustus error that has clouded the issue of 
third-party fraud inducing material mistake, because it is quite plausible that a 
mistake may be regarded as excusable merely because it was occasioned by the 
fraudulent misrepresentation of a third party.47 Aside from the fact that the iustus 
error doctrine does not seem to produce consistent results, the problem with this 
reasoning is that on the same facts one could infer reasonable mistake on the part of 
the contract denier (for being induced by the fraud of a third party48) and reasonable 
reliance on the part of the contract assertor (for being induced by the contract 
denier49).50 The only way to resolve this conundrum is to acknowledge that since the 
iustus error approach is but an indirect expression of the reliance theory, the former 
should bow to the latter when the two are in a state of conflict.51 It is therefore 
suggested that within the context of third-party fraud the iustus error approach 
should simply not be applied.52 
 
In Slip Knot Investments v Du Toit53 Malan JA also referred to the authoritative 
formulation of the reliance theory in Sonap Petroleum (SA) (Pty) Ltd v 
Pappadogianis,54 which he regarded as the decisive question in such cases: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Spindrifter (Pty) Ltd v Lester Donovan (Pty) Ltd 1986 1 SA 303 (A) 316. See further Lubbe and 
Murray Farlam and Hathaway - Contract 167; Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 
49; Hutchison and Van Heerden 1987 SALJ 524. 
47  This would seem to be the effect of some dicta, compare e.g. Musgrove and Watson (Rhodesia) 
Ltd v Rotta 1978 4 SA 656 (RA) 658B; Kok v Osborne 1993 4 SA 788 (SE) 800C-D; see further 
Musgrove and Watson (Rhod) (Pvt) Ltd v Rotta 1978 2 SA 918 (R) 925D. 
48  Compare the following dictum of Jones J in Kok v Osborne 1993 4 SA 788 (SE) 800C-D: "To be 
the victim of the fraud of another is not, of course, per se unreasonable. … Indeed, without 
detracting from the duty of every person to take proper precautions to protect himself from harm, 
the law should be slow to favour the ruthless, the unprincipled, and the skilfully and deliberately 
deceptive at the expense of a person with a trusting disposition; it will be slow to categorise his 
trust as unreasonable". 
49  See e.g. Slip Knot Investments v Du Toit 2011 4 SA 72 (SCA) paras 11-12. 
50  In fact Slip Knot v Du Toit 2011 4 SA 72 (SCA) provides a striking example of how the same 
facts can be interpreted to justify a lack of contractual liability on the basis of iustus error (the 
court a quo decision) and the imposition of liability on the grounds of reliance (the Supreme Court 
of Appeal decision). Consequently, it is fair to say that the parallel application of these principles 
within third-party fraud situations may frequently result in direct contradiction (see further 
Pretorius 2011b THRHR 191). 
51  Hutchison "Contract Formation" 191-192; Hutchison and Van Heerden 1987 SALJ 525; Pretorius 
2004b THRHR 558. 
52  See further Pretorius 2011b THRHR 191-192; see Hutchison "'Traps For the Unwary'" 56ff; Lewis 
1987 SALJ 375-377. 
53  Slip Knot Investments v Du Toit 2011 4 SA 72 (SCA) 76E-77A. 
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(D)id the party whose actual intention did not conform to the common intention 
expressed, lead the other party, as a reasonable man, to believe that his declared 
intention represented his actual intention? … To answer this question, a three-fold 
enquiry is usually necessary, namely, firstly, was there a misrepresentation as to 
one party's intention; secondly, who made that representation; and thirdly, was the 
other party misled thereby? … The last question postulates two possibilities: Was 
he actually misled and would a reasonable man have been misled? 
 
And appropriately, although the respondent pleaded his defence in terms of iustus 
error, Malan JA preferred to apply the reliance theory in the circumstances: 
 
In argument before us counsel for the respondent expressly disavowed that the 
respondent was misled by Slip Knot - whether by reason of the form in which the 
documents were couched or in any other way. To the extent that the respondent 
was misled he placed the blame squarely and solely at the doors of his brother and 
nephew. Nor is there any suggestion that the fraud or misrepresentation of the 
respondent's relatives could or should be attributed to Slip Knot. There is every 
reason to infer that Slip Knot, as a reasonable person, believed that the 
respondent's declared intention to be bound as surety as evidenced by his 
signature to the suretyship also represented his real intention. The respondent 
entered into the suretyship relying, not on any representation by Slip Knot, but on 
representations made to him by his nephew and conveyed to him by Altro 
Potgieter.55 
 
In the result it is fair to state that the Supreme Court of Appeal has provided much 
needed direction in two respects: firstly, generally speaking where material mistake 
has been induced by the fraud of an independent third party a contract nevertheless 
may still arise; and secondly, the favoured approach to determining liability appears 
to be the reliance theory.56 Although the iustus error doctrine was not expressly 
discounted in the circumstances, the general tenor of the judgment suggests that the 
reliance theory is the preferable route to follow. Appropriately also there was no 
direct enquiry as to fault on the part of the contract denier. It is submitted that the 
approach of the court is to be welcomed for bringing an element of clarity on a sound 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
54  Sonap Petroleum (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 3 SA 234 (A) 239I-240B. 
55  Sonap Petroleum (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 3 SA 234 (A) para 11. 
56  In this regard Slip Knot Investments v Du Toit 2011 4 SA 72 (SCA) ties in with what appears to 
be a growing trend of the Supreme Court of Appeal to favour the reliance theory and on occasion 
expand its application – compare e.g. Cape Group Construction (Pty) Ltd t/a Forbes 
Waterproofing v Government of the United Kingdom 2003 5 SA 180 (SCA) para 22; Constantia 
Insurance Co Ltd v Compusource (Pty) Ltd 2005 4 SA 345 (SCA) para 17; Cecil Nurse (Pty) Ltd 
v Nkola 2008 2 SA 441 (SCA) para 15; Hartley v Pyramid Freight (Pty) Ltd t/a Sun Couriers 2007 
2 SA 599 (SCA) para 6; Be Bop a Lula Manufacturing and Printing CC v Kingtex Marketing (Pty) 
Ltd 2008 3 SA 327 (SCA) para 10; Pillay v Shaik 2009 4 SA 74 (SCA) para 55. 
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theoretical basis to a section of the law of mistake that has been problematic since 
its fledgling years.57 
 
4.3 Exceptions based on policy considerations 
 
Although the judgment of Malan JA implies that third-party fraud does not negate 
contractual liability in terms of the reliance theory, it remains unclear whether this 
must be taken as a strict rule or whether there may yet be policy-driven exceptions in 
deserving instances. It is suggested that while a general rule or principle is essential 
to achieve a measure of legal certainty, there could be exceptions based on policy 
considerations peculiar to specific cases.58 This argument is strengthened by case 
law, which acknowledges that a mistaken party may be absolved from liability in 
appropriate circumstances.59 Although the authoritative formulation of the reliance 
theory in Sonap Petroleum (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis60 does not expressly 
make allowance for third-party fraud,61 conceivably a court may entertain relevant 
policy factors under the open-ended, normative element of reasonableness.62 
Another possibility, loosely based on an analogy with estoppel, is that the reliance 
theory may be developed to include an element of legal causation in terms of which 
instances of third-party fraud may be dealt with. Above all, the approach should be 
flexible and pragmatic to enable a court on the basis of relevant policy 
considerations to depart from the general premise that third-party fraud does not 
preclude contractual liability.63 
                                                          
57  Compare eg Standard Bank v Du Plooy; Standard  v Coetzee 1899 16 SC 161 168, 172; Siffman 
v Kriel 1909 TS 538 546. 
58  Compare also Christie and Bradfield Christie's The Law of Contract 331-332; see further Février-
Breed 1995 TSAR 304ff. 
59  Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman 1979 3 SA 978 (A) 1000B; Musgrove and 
Watson (Rhodesia) Ltd v Rotta 1978 4 SA 656 (RA) 658B; Musgrove and Watson (Rhod) (Pvt) 
Ltd v Rotta 1978 2 SA 918 (R) 925D; Kok v Osborne 1993 4 SA 788 (SE) 800C-D; Standard 
Credit Corporation Ltd v Naicker 1987 2 SA 49 (N) 52B-C; Standard Bank v Du Plooy; Standard 
Bank v Coetzee 1899 16 SC 161 172. Incidentally one finds similar ambiguity in positive law 
throughout the law of obligations, where the deliberate intervention of a third party is involved, 
suggesting that there is no single rule or principle that fits all cases (see Pretorius 2011b THRHR 
205-207). 
60  Quoted at para 4.2  
61  See Floyd and Pretorius 1992 THRHR 673. 
62  On this element of reliance see further Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 40-41; 
Pretorius 2005b THRHR 585-586. 
63  For a detailed account see Pretorius 2011b THRHR 192-195. 
C-J PRETORIUS                                                                       PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
199 / 261 
 
 
A number of policy considerations could potentially influence a court's decision 
where third-party fraud is involved,64 but two may be specifically mentioned. In the 
first place there is the element of risk inherent in choosing a messenger to convey 
communications between parties. If the contract assertor chooses an independent 
third party to act as messenger between the parties, he or she should bear the 
consequences of a material mistake on the part of the contract denier caused by the 
fraudulent misrepresentation of the messenger. In such circumstances the principle 
of risk65 could indicate that ultimately the contract assertor's reliance was not 
reasonable.66 In the second place one may consider the question of prejudice.67 
Where the contract assertor has not incurred expenses or otherwise detrimentally 
altered his or her position, and where the status quo can easily be restored, it may 
be an indication that liability should not lie.68 These are but examples of factors that 
could sway the equities in favour of the contract denier; however, a court will 
probably have to be convinced that there clearly is good reason to deviate from the 
approach in Slip Knot Investments v Du Toit. 
 
4.4 Suretyships and third-party fraud 
 
It may also briefly be mentioned that third-party fraud often seems to surface within 
the context of suretyship agreements. Typically, the contract denier is misled by the 
third party into believing that he or she is signing something other than a suretyship - 
                                                          
64  See further Pretorius 2011b THRHR 193-194. 
65  The risk theory or principle may be employed as a possible corrective to the will theory in that a 
party who by his or her conduct creates the risk of dissensus, and disagreement eventuates, may 
be held liable on the basis of risk assumption. Although not an independent ground for 
contractual liability, risk can be accommodated within present contract theory as a factor that 
may influence the reasonableness of a party's conduct (see generally Hofmann 1935 SALJ 436; 
Floyd and Pretorius 1992 THRHR 672-673; Pretorius 2005a THRHR 453 footnote 79; see further 
Lubbe and Murray Farlam and Hathaway - Contract 163). 
66  See further Kok v Osborne 1993 4 SA 788 (SE) 800; Floyd and Pretorius 1994 THRHR 328. 
67  This consideration is based on an analogy with estoppel with its close ties to the reliance theory 
(see generally Christie and Bradfield Christie's The Law of Contract 26-30; De Wet and Van Wyk 
Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg 21 and further; Rabie and Sonnekus Law of Estoppel 194-196; 
Hutchison and Pretorius Law of Contract 92-97; Pretorius 2004a THRHR 389-393). 
68  See further Musgrove and Watson (Rhod) (Pvt) Ltd v Rotta 1978 2 SA 918 (R) 926B-E; 
Musgrove and Watson (Rhodesia) Ltd v Rotta 1978 4 SA 656 (RA) 658B-C; De Wet and Van 
Wyk Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg 22; Lubbe and Murray Farlam and Hathaway - Contract 167-
168. 
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an onerous agreement by its very nature.69 Generally where a representative of 
some or other legal entity signs a personal suretyship agreement as security for the 
debts of the entity and then pleads justifiable mistake when the suretyship is 
enforced, the courts have been wary of lightly absolving the surety from the liability.70 
Where, however, there have been clear indications of underhandedness on the part 
of the creditor they have not hesitated in striking down the agreement.71 The fairly 
strict approach that the courts have followed in this regard, especially since the 
caveat subscriptor rule applies,72 is a reminder that traditionally the scope for a 
successful plea of unilateral mistake has been rather limited.73 Although on the other 
hand on occasion the provincial courts have perhaps been a little too lenient,74 Slip 
Knot confirms that the signatory of a contractual document embodying a suretyship 
will not easily escape liability, even where his or her actions are the result of the 
fraudulent endeavours of a third party. 
 
Some may consider the decision in Slip Knot quite harsh, especially since the 
signatory had no interest in the documents that he was signing. This case also 
contrasts rather starkly with the Supreme Court of Appeal decision in Brink v 
Humphries & Jewell (Pty) Ltd,75 where an otherwise astute businessman and director 
of a company signed a one-page document (on behalf of the company) that 
                                                          
69  See e.g. Standard Bank v Du Plooy; Standard Bank v Coetzee 1899 16 SC 161; Musgrove and 
Watson (Rhod) (Pvt) Ltd v Rotta 1978 2 SA 918 (R); Musgrove and Watson (Rhodesia) Ltd v 
Rotta 1978 4 SA 656 (RA); Khan v Naidoo 1989 3 SA 724 (N). 
70  Compare eg Roomer v Wedge Steel (Pty) Ltd 1998 1 SA 538 (N); Diners Club SA (Pty) Ltd v 
Thorburn 1990 2 SA 870 (C); Tesoriero v Bhyjo Investments Share Block (Pty) Ltd 2000 1 SA 
167 (W); Blue Chip Consultants (Pty) Ltd v Shamrock 2002 3 SA 231 (W); Advanced Mechanical 
and Lubrication Technology (Pty) Ltd v Conradie Ontwikkelings BK 2006 JOL 16692 (T); 
Langeveld v Union Finance Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2007 4 SA 572 (W); Royal Canin South Africa 
(Pty) Ltd v Cooper 2008 6 SA 644 (SE); see further Stiff v Q Data Distribution (Pty) Ltd 2003 2 
SA 336 (SCA); Cecil Nurse (Pty) Ltd v Nkola 2008 2 SA 441 (SCA). 
71  See eg Prins v Absa Bank Ltd 1998 3 SA 904 (C) 911D; Davids v Absa Bank Bpk 2005 3 SA 361 
(C) para 23. 
72  In terms of s 6 General Law Amendment Act 50 of 1956 a suretyship must be embodied in a 
document signed by or on behalf of the surety. This provision seeks to promote legal certainty 
and also possibly to bring the contractual provisions to the attention of the surety given the 
onerous nature of suretyships (see Fourlamel (Pty) Ltd v Maddison 1977 1 SA 333 (A) 342-343; 
Forsyth and Pretorius Caney's The Law of Suretyship 67-69). 
73  National and Overseas Distributors Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Potato Board 1958 2 SA 473 (A) 
479G-H; Diners Club SA (Pty) Ltd v Thorburn 1990 2 SA 870 (C) 874D-E; Christie and Bradfield 
Christie's Law of Contract 329. 
74  See eg Keens Group Co (Pty) Ltd v Lötter 1989 1 SA 585 (C). For justified criticism of this 
decision see Sharrock 1989 SALJ 458 and further. 
75  Brink v Humphries and Jewell (Pty) Ltd 2005 2 SA 419 (SCA). 
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contained a personal suretyship clause without reading it, although he had ample 
opportunity to do so. The court upheld the signatory's plea of iustus error because 
the form was "a trap for the unwary" and the signatory was justifiably misled by it.76 
This decision has drawn criticism77 and the courts seem hesitant to apply it.78 
Nevertheless, in reaching his conclusion in Slip Knot Malan JA seemed to 
emphasise that as a trustee of a trust the signatory should have duly observed his 
duties and, more importantly, the creditor was entitled to rely on his signature on the 
suretyship just as much as it was justified in relying on his signature on the other 
trust documents. In this regard Slip Knot perhaps suggests a stricter approach than 
was adopted in Brink to instances where directors of companies, members of close 
corporations, trustees of trusts and the like sign contractual documents relating to 
the dealings of the entity represented.79 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
The question of whether or not the material mistake of a contractant induced by the 
fraud of an independent third party is sufficient to sustain a plea of iustus error or a 
lack of reasonable reliance has finally been settled by the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
Slip Knot Investments v Du Toit confirms that in such instances the mistaken party 
will not be exonerated from contractual liability where the other contractual party has 
been led to reasonably believe that the mistaken party has bound him- or herself to 
the juristic act in question. The situation in this regard now broadly mirrors the legal 
position where a third party fraudulently induces a non-material mistake on the part 
of a contractant: the fraud of the third party does not affect contractual liability where 
there is in fact consensus ad idem (in cases of non-material mistake) or reasonable 
reliance (in cases of material mistake). 
 
                                                          
76  Brink v Humphries and Jewell (Pty) Ltd 2005 2 SA 419 (SCA) 426C. 
77  See e.g. Hutchison "Contract Formation" 41-42, 47-52, 57-58; Bhana and Nortjé 2005 Annual 
Survey of South Africa 208ff. 
78  See e.g. Royal Canin South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Cooper 2008 6 SA 644 (SE) 647-648. 
79  Regarding mistake and suretyships see further Forsyth and Pretorius Contract Law Casebook 
64-67; Otto 2005 TSAR 805 and further; Cilliers and Luiz 1996 THRHR 168ff; Pretorius 2009 
Obiter 763 and further. 
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The position prior to this decision was characterised by uncertainty and contradiction 
largely caused by applying the iustus error approach and the question of negligence 
on the part of the contract denier to third-party fraud situations. The iustus error 
doctrine proves indeterminate in such instances because it could provide the reason 
either for contractual liability (if negligence on the part of the contract denier is 
regarded as decisive) or the lack thereof (if negligence on the part of the contract 
denier is automatically negated by the fraud of the third party). Earlier decisions 
reflect the ambivalence that the iustus error doctrine suffers from in this regard. 
Moreover, even if the conduct of the mistaken party is regarded as excusable for 
being induced by the fraud of a third party, there would still almost inevitably be 
conflict between the iustus error approach and reliance theory where the belief of the 
contract assertor in consensus was reasonable in the circumstances. Although in 
Slip Knot the court did not expressly exclude the iustus error approach from third-
party fraud cases, it clearly favoured the application of the reliance theory in such 
circumstances. Justification for this proposition may be derived from the fact that 
although the case was pleaded in terms of iustus error, the court regarded the test 
for reliance as decisive in the circumstances and clearly applied it to the facts. It is 
suggested that the law of mistake would benefit from express exclusion of the iustus 
error doctrine from third-party fraud situations. 
 
It is further submitted that there may in fact be exceptional cases where the mistaken 
party should be relieved from contractual liability on the basis of policy 
considerations peculiar to the specific circumstances. In this manner reliance which 
at first seems reasonable for being induced by the conduct of the contract denier 
may upon further reflection be regarded as unreasonable based on, for instance, the 
consideration of risk creation at the hand of the contract assertor who has insisted on 
a specific third party as messenger between the contractants, and who perpetrates 
the fraud. Admitting exceptions in appropriate circumstances would provide a 
measure of consonance with earlier case law where a court has intuitively felt that 
liability should not lie, even if the court's approach was open to theoretical criticism. 
C-J PRETORIUS                                                                       PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
203 / 261 
 
Bibliography 
 
Bhana and Nortjé 2005 Annual Survey of South African Law 
Bhana D and Nortjé M "General Principles of Contract" 2005 Annual Survey 
of South African Law 196-252 
 
Christie and Bradfield Christie's The Law of Contract 
Christie RH and Bradfield GB Christie's The Law of Contract in South Africa 
6th ed (LexisNexis Durban 2011) 
 
Cilliers and Luiz 1996 THRHR 
Cilliers JB and Luiz SM "Caveat Subscriptor – Beware the Hidden Suretyship 
Clause" 1996 THRHR 168-175 
 
De Wet and Van Wyk Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg 
De Wet JC and Van Wyk AH Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en 
Handelsreg Vol 1 5th ed (Butterworths Durban 1992) 
 
Février-Breed 1995 TSAR 
Février-Breed P "A Perspective on the Justus-requirement in Justus Error" 
1995 TSAR 300-309 
 
Février-Breed 1996 THRHR 
Février-Breed P "The 'Fault Principle' and Justus error in Mistake in Contract" 
1996 THRHR 209-218 
 
Floyd 1996 THRHR 
Floyd TB "Die Begrip Ooreenkoms - 'n Bydrae tot die Teorie van Regsfeite" 
1996 THRHR 557-576 
 
C-J PRETORIUS                                                                       PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
204 / 261 
 
Floyd and Pretorius 1992 THRHR 
Floyd TB and Pretorius C-J "A Reconciliation of the Different Approaches to 
Contractual Liability in the Absence of Actual Consensus" 1992 THRHR 668-
673 
 
Floyd and Pretorius 1994 THRHR 
Floyd TB and Pretorius C-J "Mistake and Supervening Impossibility of 
Performance" 1994 THRHR 325-329 
 
Forsyth and Pretorius Caney's The Law of Suretyship 
Forsyth CF and Pretorius JT Caney's The Law of Suretyship 6th ed (Juta Cape 
Town 2010) 
 
Hawthorne and Pretorius Contract Law Casebook 
Hawthorne L and Pretorius C-J Contract Law Casebook 3rd ed (Juta Cape 
Town 2010) 
 
Hofmann 1935 SALJ 
Hofmann LC "The Basis of the Effect of Mistake on Contractual Obligations" 
1935 SALJ 432-449 
 
Hutchison "Contract Formation" 
Hutchison D "Contract Formation" in Zimmermann R and Visser D (eds) 
Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (Clarendon 
Press Oxford 1996) 165-194 
 
Hutchison "'Traps For the Unwary'" 
Hutchison D "'Traps For the Unwary': When Careless Errors are Excusable" in 
Glover G (ed) Essays in Honour of AJ Kerr (LexisNexis Durban 2006) 39-58 
 
Hutchison and Pretorius Law of Contract 
Hutchison D and Pretorius C-J (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 
(Oxford Cape Town 2009) 
C-J PRETORIUS                                                                       PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
205 / 261 
 
 
Hutchison and Van Heerden 1987 SALJ 
Hutchison D and Van Heerden BJ "Mistake in Contract: A Comedy of (Justus) 
Errors" 1987 SALJ 523-530 
 
Joubert General Principles of the Law of Contract 
 Joubert DJ General Principles of the Law of Contract (Juta Cape Town 1987) 
 
Kerr Principles of the Law of Contract 
 Kerr AJ The Principles of the Law of Contract 6th ed (Butterworths Durban 
2002) 
 
Lewis 1987 SALJ 
Lewis C "Caveat Subscriptor and the Doctrine of Justus Error" 1987 SALJ 
371-377 
 
Lubbe and Murray Farlam and Hathaway - Contract 
Lubbe GF and Murray CM Farlam and Hathaway - Contract: Cases, Materials 
and Commentary 3rd ed (Juta Cape Town 1988) 
 
Otto 2005 TSAR 
Otto JM "Verskuilde Borgstellings in Standaardkontrakte en Iustus Error" 2005 
TSAR 805-814 
 
Pretorius 2004a THRHR 
Pretorius C-J "The Basis of Contractual Liability in South African Law (2)" 
2004 THRHR 383-393 
 
Pretorius 2004b THRHR 
Pretorius C-J "The Basis of Contractual Liability in South African Law (3)" 
2004 THRHR 549-565 
 
C-J PRETORIUS                                                                       PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
206 / 261 
 
Pretorius 2005a THRHR 
Pretorius C-J "The Basis of Contractual Liability (2): Theories of Contract (Will 
and Declaration)" 2005 THRHR 441-460 
 
Pretorius 2005b THRHR 
Pretorius C-J "The Basis of Contractual Liability (3): Theories of Contract 
(Consideration, Reliance and Fairness)" 2005 THRHR 575-593 
 
Pretorius 2009 Obiter 
Pretorius C-J "Mistake and Suretyship: Avoiding the Spectre of Brink v 
Humphreys & Jewell (Pty) Ltd" 2009 Obiter 763-773 
 
Pretorius 2011a THRHR 
Pretorius C-J "Deliberate Third Party Conduct and the Creation of Obligations 
(1): Delict and Unjustified Enrichment" 2011 THRHR 65-86 
 
Pretorius 2011b THRHR 
Pretorius C-J "Deliberate Third Party Conduct and the Creation of Obligations 
(2): Contract and Estoppel" 2011 THRHR 182-207 
 
Rabie and Sonnekus Law of Estoppel 
Rabie PJ and Sonnekus JC The Law of Estoppel in South Africa 2nd ed 
(Butterworths Durban 2000) 
 
Sharrock 1989 SALJ 
Sharrock RD "Inappropriate Wording in a Contract: A Basis for the Defence of 
Iustus Error?" 1989 SALJ 458-464 
 
Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 
Van der Merwe S et al Contract: General Principles 3rd ed (Juta Cape Town 
2007) 
 
C-J PRETORIUS                                                                       PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
207 / 261 
 
Van der Merwe and Van Huyssteen 1993 TSAR 
Van der Merwe S and Van Huyssteen LF "Kontraksluiting en Toerekenbare 
Skyn" 1993 TSAR 493-497 
 
Van Rensburg 1986 THRHR 
Van Rensburg ADJ "Die Grondslag van Kontraktuele Gebondenheid" 1986 
THRHR 448-459 
 
Van Rensburg et al "Contract" 
Van Rensburg ADJ et al "Contract" in Joubert WA, Faris JA and Harms LTC 
(eds) The Law of South Africa Volume 5 Part 1 2nd ed (LexisNexis Durban 
2004) 
 
Wessels Wessels' Law of Contract 
Roberts AA Wessels' Law of Contract in South Africa Volume 1 2nd ed 
(Butterworth Durban 1951) 
 
Register of cases 
 
Advanced Mechanical & Lubrication Technology (Pty) Ltd v Conradie Ontwikkelings 
BK 2006 JOL 16692 (T) 
Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) 
Be Bop a Lula Manufacturing & Printing CC v Kingtex Marketing (Pty) Ltd 2008 3 SA 
327 (SCA) 
Blue Chip Consultants (Pty) Ltd v Shamrock 2002 3 SA 231 (W) 
Bodemer v American Insurance Co 1961 2 SA 662 (A) 
Brink v Humphries & Jewell (Pty) Ltd 2005 2 SA 419 (SCA) 
Cape Group Construction (Pty) Ltd t/a Forbes Waterproofing v Government of the 
United Kingdom 2003 5 SA 180 (SCA) 
Cecil Nurse (Pty) Ltd v Nkola 2008 2 SA 441 (SCA) 
Constantia Insurance Co Ltd v Compusource (Pty) Ltd 2005 4 SA 345 (SCA) 
Davids v Absa Bank Bpk 2005 3 SA 361 (C) 
Diners Club SA (Pty) Ltd v Thorburn 1990 2 SA 870 (C) 
C-J PRETORIUS                                                                       PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
208 / 261 
 
Du Toit v Atkinson's Motors Bpk 1985 2 SA 893 (A) 
Fedbond Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Meier 2008 1 SA 458 (C) 
Fourie v Hansen 2001 1 All SA 510 (W) 
Fourlamel (Pty) Ltd v Maddison 1977 1 SA 333 (A) 
George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 1958 2 SA 465 (A) 
Hartley v Pyramid Freight (Pty) Ltd t/a Sun Couriers 2007 2 SA 599 (SCA) 
Hlobo v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund 2001 2 SA 59 (SCA) 
Horty Investments (Pty) Ltd v Interior Acoustics (Pty) Ltd 1984 3 SA 537 (W) 
Karabus Motors (1959) Ltd v Van Eck 1962 1 SA 451 (C) 
Keens Group Co (Pty) Ltd v Lötter 1989 1 SA 585 (C) 
Khan v Naidoo 1989 3 SA 724 (N) 
Kok v Osborne 1993 4 SA 788 (SE) 
Langeveld v Union Finance Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2007 4 SA 572 (W) 
Musgrove and Watson (Rhod) (Pvt) Ltd v Rotta 1978 2 SA 918 (R) 
Musgrove and Watson (Rhodesia) Ltd v Rotta 1978 4 SA 656 (RA) 
National and Overseas Distributors Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Potato Board 1958 2 SA 
473 (A) 
Pillay v Shaik 2009 4 SA 74 (SCA) 
Potgieter v British Airways plc 2005 3 SA 133 (C) 
Prins v Absa Bank Ltd 1998 3 SA 904 (C) 
Roomer v Wedge Steel (Pty) Ltd 1998 1 SA 538 (N) 
Royal Canin South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Cooper 2008 6 SA 644 (SE) 
Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman 1979 3 SA 978 (A) 
Siffman v Kriel 1909 TS 538 
Slip Knot Investments v Du Toit 2011 4 SA 72 (SCA) 
Sonap Petroleum (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 3 SA 234 (A) 
Spindrifter (Pty) Ltd v Lester Donovan (Pty) Ltd 1986 1 SA 303 (A) 
Standard Bank v Du Plooy; Standard Bank v Coetzee 1899 16 SC 161 
Standard Credit Corporation Ltd v Naicker 1987 2 SA 49 (N) 
Stiff v Q Data Distribution (Pty) Ltd 2003 2 SA 336 (SCA) 
Tesoriero v Bhyjo Investments Share Block (Pty) Ltd 2000 1 SA 167 (W) 
Trans-Drakensberg Bank Ltd v Guy 1964 1 SA 790 (D) 
Western Province Wine Depot Ltd v Bellingham 1966 1 SA 349 (T) 
C-J PRETORIUS                                                                       PER / PELJ 2011(14)7 
209 / 261 
 
 
Register of legislation 
 
General Law Amendment Act 50 of 1956 
 
List of abbreviations 
 
SALJ South African Law Journal 
THRHR Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 
TSAR Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 
 
